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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN COATING, INC., an Oregon 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GIBBONS & REED, a Utah corporation, 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
a Utah Corporation and CONTINENTAL-
HAGEN, a Utah Corporation 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 880289 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff and Appellant Western Coating, Inc. ("Appellant 
Western Coating"), by and through its counsel of record, hereby 
submits this Brief. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3), (1953, as amended). 
Defendants and Respondents Gibbons & Reed and American 
Insurance Company ("Respondent Gibbons & Reed and Respondent 
American Insurance Company or Respondents") brought a Motion for 
Summary Judgment before the lower court on June 6, 1988. At 
that hearing, the lower court was asked to determine whether 
Appellant Western Coating's claim on the payment bond fell within 
the scope of protection of the Utah Procurement Code, U.C.A. 
Section 63-56-38, 1953 as amended. (R. 67). 
The lower court submitted a Memorandum Decision in the 
matter granting the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
68). The lower court ruled that Appellant Western Coating was 
too remote in the contract chain from the general contractor to 
come within the protection of the Utah Procurement Code and 
therefore its claim was barred. (R. 68). Judgement was entered 
on July 1, 1988. (R. 72). Appellant Western Coating filed a 
Notice of Appeal in this matter on July 27, 1988. (R. 74). 
Default judgment had previously been entered against Defendant 
Continental-Hagen. (R. 15). Said default judgment is not a part 
of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Appellant Western Coating's claim for payment of 
materials that were admittedly supplied to and incorporated into 
a project in which a payment bond was obtained pursuant to the 
Utah Procurement Code should be denied simply because it is a 
supplier in the third tier. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
The controlling statute in this matter is Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985), hereinafter referred to as 
the "Utah Procurement Code." A copy of the 1985 enactment of the 
Utah Procurement Code is found in the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Utah Department of Transportation entered into a 
contract with Respondent Gibbons & Reed on or about April 8, 1986 
for the construction of the road located at 11th East to 20th 
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East and 1-215 in Salt Lake City (the "Project"). (R. 46). In 
accordance with Utah's Procurement Code, Respondent Gibbons & 
Reed obtained a payment bond from Respondent American Insurance 
Company for the protection of those supplying labor and materials 
to the Project. (R. 46). 
Respondent Gibbons & Reed entered into a subcontract with 
Pacheco & Martinez wherein Pacheco & Martinez agreed to furnish 
and install black and epoxy reinforcing steel on the Project. (R. 
46). Pacheco and Martinez then entered into a contract with 
Continental-Hagen for the purchase of the black and epoxy 
reinforcing steel. (R. 46). Appellant Western Coating contracted 
with Continental-Hagen to supply Continental-Hagen with epoxy 
coated re-bar for use on the Project. (R. 3). 
Continental-Hagen failed to pay Appellant Western Coating 
the balance due of $30,904.80 for said materials. (R. 4). 
Appellant Western Coating made timely demand upon Respondents for 
payment for the materials it furnished for use on the Project 
under the payment bond that was furnished pursuant to the 
Procurement Code. (R. 4). 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
It is Appellant's position that the Utah Procurement Code 
stands in lieu of the mechanic's lien statute on public work 
projects. Just as the mechanic's lien statute protects all who 
provide labor and materials related to the improvement of real 
property, the Procurement Code is designed to protect all those 
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who supply labor and materials to state owned public work 
projects. 
Further, the reference to "subcontractor" in the Procurement 
Code does not preclude some parties that provided labor or 
materials to the project from bringing claims under the 
Procurement Code based on their position in the contract chain. 
Thus, Appellant Western Coating, as a supplier of materials 
utilized in the construction of the Project, may bring a claim 
for payment for materials utilized in the Project pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code. 
Finally, federal case law relating to the Miller Act is not 
dispositive. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE PROCUREMENT CODE STANDS IN LIEU OF THE 
MECHANIC'S LIEN ON PUBLIC WORK PROJECTS AS PROTECTION FOR THOSE 
WHO SUPPLY LABOR AND MATERIALS TO THE PROJECTS. 
It is Appellant Western Coating's position that the Utah 
Procurement Code stands in lieu of the mechanic's lien statutes 
and is designed to protect all those who supply labor and 
materials for public works. Thus, any party that actually 
supplies labor or materials to a public project should be 
included within the scope of protection provided by the Utah 
Procurement Code. 
Utah courts have long recognized the relation between the 
mechanic's lien law and the bonding statutes. This relationship 
was recently reaffirmed in Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Construction 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App., 1988). 
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In Cox Rock Products, the Court of Appeals of Utah was asked 
to review whether the statutes relied on by a supplier to a 
subcontractor to Ephraim City seeking to recover on a payment 
bond were in effect at the relevant times. In making its 
determination, the Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the 
statutes relating to mechanic's liens and payment bonds. 
The Court of Appeals began their review of the history of 
said statutes by stating the following: 
Ordinarily, one who is not in "privity" with another cannot 
sue that party to recover on a contract. . . . However, to 
protect construction suppliers and subcontractors from the 
harshness of that doctrine, two principal devices have been 
created -- the mechanic's lien and the payment bond. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 673. 
As the mechanic's lien statute precludes the filing of liens 
on public buildings, structures or improvements, " . . . suppliers 
and subcontractors have principally looked for protection to the 
second device, namely that of the payment bond, when providing 
labor or supplies for construction projects contracted for by 
governmental entities." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 674. 
In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 374 P.2d 254 
(Utah, 1962), Utah's Supreme Court stated that "This contractors 
bond statute is closely related in purpose. . . to that of our 
mechanics lien statute. . ." King Bros, at 255. 
In Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 
P.2d 837 (1959), the court stated: 
. The purpose of the mechanics and materialmen's lien statutes 
and likewise the statutes quoted hereinabove, [the private 
payment bond statutes] is to prevent the owners of land from 
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having their lands improved with the materials and labor 
furnished and performed by a third person, and thus to 
enhance the value of such lands, without becoming personally 
responsible for the reasonable value of the materials and 
labor which enhance the value of those lands. The owner may 
escape personal liability by obtaining the bond as required 
by the statute, (footnote omitted) 
Crane at 839. 
The mechanic's lien statute has always recognized that every 
supplier to a project falls within the scope of its protection. 
The mechanic's lien statute, U.C.A. Section 38-1-3 (1953, as 
amended), states that those entitled to the lien are 
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any 
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building 
or structure. . . . " (Emphasis added.) The mechanic's lien 
statute does not distinguish amongst parties based on their 
relation to the general contractor. Likewise, the Procurement 
Code is not intended to distinguish amongst parties based on 
their relation to the general contractor. 
As the mechanic's lien statute and the bonding statutes are 
similar in purpose, all suppliers to a project should be included 
within the scope of protection provided by the Utah Procurement 
Code. Appellant Western Coating indisputably provided materials 
to a public project. Appellant Western Coating was not paid in 
full for the materials it provided to this Project. Appellant 
Western Coating is precluded by law from filing a mechanic's lien 
on the Project. Appellant Western Coating's only recourse is on 
the payment bond which was provided for the protection of those 
6 
who provided labor and materials to the Project. The lower court 
erred in ruling that Appellant Western Coating was too remote to 
fall within the scope of protection of the Procurement Code. The 
payment bonds provided pursuant to the Procurement Code are for 
the protection of all who provide labor and materials to a public 
project. 
POINT II. THE TERM "SUBCONTRACTOR," AS USED IN THE 
PROCUREMENT CODE, ENCOMPASSES ALL WHO PROVIDE LABOR AND MATERIALS 
TO A PUBLIC PROJECT. 
The Utah Procurement Code states: 
Any person who has furnished labor or material to the 
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in the 
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished 
under this section, who has not been paid in full therefor 
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor 
was performed by him or material was supplied by him for 
which the claim is made, may sue on the payment bond for any 
amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and may 
prosecute the action for the amount due him. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The language of the Procurement Code was not intended to bar 
claims of those not in direct privity with the general contractor 
or the first tier subcontractor. The Procurement Code is for 
the protection of those parties that provide labor or materials 
as provided for in the contract. Appellant Western Coating 
contends that the use of the term "subcontractor" in the 
Procurement Code is used generically and should not be used to 
drive a wedge between those who provide labor or material equally 
vital to the work provided for in the contract. 
Colorado's Supreme Court, in South-way Construction Co. v. 
Adams City Service, 458 P.2d 250, 251 (Colorado, 1969), faced an 
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issue practically identical to the present issue, and determined 
that a supplier to a sub-subcontractor could bring a claim for 
payment under a payment bond provided pursuant to Colorado's 
public bonding statute. 
Colorado's public bonding statute states that a claim may be 
filed by any person who has furnished labor or materials "used or 
consumed by such contractor or his subcontractor, in or about the 
performance of the work contracted to be done. This language 
referring to "contractors and subcontractors" is very similar to 
the language of Utah's Procurement Code. However, Colorado's 
Supreme Court did not find that the language referencing a 
subcontractor was limiting with respect to which parties could 
file claims. In making its determination that the term 
subcontractor has a very broad meaning, Colorado's Supreme Court 
stated: 
To construe the term "subcontractor" so as to exclude a 
"sub-subcontractor" from the protection granted by the 
contractor's bond statute would require us to ignore the 
purpose of the statute. Since the benefits of our 
mechanic's lien act do not apply to projects constructed by 
governmental agencies, a remedy similar to our mechanic's 
lien statute was provided by the legislature for the 
protection of those furnishing supplies or material for such 
projects. . . The statute stands in lieu of the mechanic's 
lien statute and is designed to protect those who supply 
labor and materials for public works." 
South-way Construction Co. v. Adams City Service, 458 P.2d 
250, 251 (Colorado, 1969). 
Likewise, under Massachusetts law, suppliers to a sub-
subcontractor or second-tier subcontractor are protected under 
the public bonding statute. In Peters v. Hartford Accident and 
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Indemnity Company, 389 N.E.2d 63, (Mass. 1979), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court was asked to review whether the legislature 
intended to curtail the scope of coverage of the public bonding 
statute by its 1972 amendment which states: 
Any claimant having a contractual relationship with a 
subcontractor performing labor or both performing labor and 
furnishing materials pursuant to a contract with the general 
contractor but no contractual relationship with the 
contractor principal furnishing the bond shall have the 
right to enforce any such claim as provided . . . 
In making its determination regarding the above language, 
the court first stated that the public bonding statute is an 
outgrowth of the mechanics' lien statutes which do not have 
distinctions between subcontractors and is to provide security to 
those who furnish labor or materials to public works. 
The court went on to rule: 
We do not construe the words, f[a]ny claimant having a 
contractual relationship with a subcontractor performing 
. . . pursuant to a contract with the general' as barring 
all claims against a subcontractor not in direct privity 
with the general contractor. . . Rather, it more generally 
signifies acts done in accordance with, by reason of, in 
agreement with, or in the prosecution of, the contract. . . 
Ultimately, a sub-subcontractor who performs a portion of 
the contract performs it 'pursuant to a contract with the 
general contractor,' although his relationship with the 
contract is indirect . . . Finally, the result we reach 
furthers the public policy of ensuring security for all 
laborers working at a public project site, and thereby 
promotes the unhampered completion of such projects. 
(Emphasis added) 
Peters at 67, 68. 
Appellant Western Coating requests this court to adopt the 
position taken by the Colorado and Massachusetts state courts and 
rule that all entities providing labor or materials to public 
projects fall within the protection of Utah's Procurement Code. 
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POINT III. DECISIONS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL MILLER ACT ARE 
NOT DISPOSITIVE OF ISSUES RELATING TO THE UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE. 
In the lower court proceeding, Respondents relied on court 
rulings relating to the Miller Act. The Miller Act is the 
federal government's public bonding statute and federal courts, 
based on federal legislative history, have ruled that suppliers 
to materialmen cannot recover under public contractor's bonds 
provided pursuant to the Miller Act. Some state courts have 
adopted similar rulings to the Miller Act when ruling on this 
issue. 
Even though Utah's public bonding statutes have, on 
occasion, been referred to as the "Little Miller Act, ffl Utah is 
not bound to adopt federal court case law interpreting the Miller 
Act when ruling on issues relating to Utah's Procurement Code. 
Federal case law relating to the Miller Act is not controlling on 
this specific issue relating to the Utah Procurement Code. And, 
as presented in this Brief, other state courts have not felt 
bound to Miller Act case law when interpreting their respective 
states' public bonding statutes. 
In State of New Mexico, ex. rel. W.M. Carroll & Co. v. K.L. 
House Construction Co., Inc., 656 P.2d 236 (N.M. 1982), New 
1
 In Cox Rock Products, the Appellate Court referred to 
Utah's original public bonding statute, U.C.A. Section 14-1-5 as 
the "Little Miller Act." While providing similar relief to that 
of the Miller Act, said Section is not identical to the Miller 
Act. It has been amended numerous times and it was even repealed 
in 1980 and then reenacted in 1983. Further said section is not 
even the statute which governs the instant matter, although it 
provides similar relief. 
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Mexicof s Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a third tier 
supplier was entitled to protection under New Mexico's "Little 
Miller Act." The trial court had determined, on summary 
judgment, that the third tier supplier was entitled to protection 
under New Mexico's "Little Miller Act." 
New Mexico's Supreme Court began its discussion with, "The 
Little Miller Act is modeled after the federal Miller Act. . . 
These statutes are intended to provide a remedy equivalent to 
that of a materialmen's lien, which ordinarily may not attach to 
government property." Carroll & Co. at 236. While acknowledging 
that the federal courts have determined that suits may only be 
brought under the Miller Act by parties having a direct 
contractual relationship with the general or a subcontractor who 
in turn deals directly with the general contractor, the New 
Mexico court reached a different result with respect to their 
"Little Miller Act." 
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated: 
We recognize that the federal cases are contrary, but those 
cases rely on legislative history which is inapplicable to the 
New Mexico statute. 
Our conclusion is supported by analogy to the provisions 
governing mechanic's and materialmen's liens. Under Section 48-
2-2, N.M.S.A. 1978, a party in Carroll's position would have a 
lien on the building if the construction project were private. 
Because the project involved here is governmental, no lien can 
attach. 
Carroll & Co., at 237, 238. 
Thus, the court held that New Mexico's "Little Miller Act" 
provided coverage to suppliers of materials under any subcontract 
involving a state construction project. 
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Each state court interprets its own statutes, including 
those statutes governing the bonding of public projects. 
Regardless of whether these statutes are even nicknamed the 
"Little Miller Act," states are not bound to adopt federal Miller 
Act case law when making rulings on their "Little Miller Acts." 
Utah's appellate courts have not yet ruled on this issue and this 
court is free to make a ruling aside from the Miller Act 
decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The public payment bond statutes stand in lieu of the 
mechanic lien statutes on public work projects. As parties 
supplying labor or materials to public work projects are 
prohibited from filing liens on the projects in the event they 
are not paid, their only recourse is to institute an action on 
the payment bonds that are provided pursuant to law. In the 
instant action, a payment bond was obtained pursuant to Utah's 
Procurement Code for the protection of all who supplied labor or 
materials to the Project. Appellant Western Coating indisputably 
supplied materials to the Project and was not paid for the 
materials it supplied to the Project. Appellant Western 
Coating's only recourse is on that payment bond which was 
provided for its protection. 
The references to "subcontractor" in the Procurement Code 
should not limit those able to file claims under the Procurement 
Code. The term "subcontractor" is very broad and applies to 
those who supply labor and materials. All entities that provide 
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labor or materials to a state-owned project should fall within 
the protection of Utah's Procurement Code. 
Appellant Western Coating respectfully requests this court 
to reverse the lower court's determination on Summary Judgment 
that Appellant Western Coating was outside the scope of 
protection of the Utah Procurement Code. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1988. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: il]miJ\^f^b^ ^U^SmiA^wJ\ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, the 
requisite copies of Appellant's Brief to Bryce Roe, Attorney for 
Respondents, Fabian & Clendennin, 215 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 this 29th day of December, 1988. 
\(kAjL 
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APPENDIX 
63-56-37 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
63-56-37. Bid security requirements, 
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least 5% of the amount of the bid 
shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts. 
Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety company authorized to do 
business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form satisfactory to 
the state. 
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set 
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to 
rules and regulations, it is determined that the failure to comply with the 
security requirements is nonsubstantial. 
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period speci-
fied in the invitation for bids, except as provided in section [Subsection] 
63-56-20(6). If a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action 
shall be taken against the bidder or the bid security. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L. 
1980, ctu 75, § 1. 
63-56-3S, Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following bonds or secu-
rity shall be delivered to the state and shall become binding on the parties 
upon the execution of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in am amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
the state, for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to 
the contractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or 
payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of the 
state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract, in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full 
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or 
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made, may sue on 
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and 
may prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any person having a 
contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied 
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of 
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor 
and surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the 
claim is made. The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and 
the name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the 
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material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered or certified 
mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place the 
contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district 
court of the county in which the construction contract was to be performed. No 
suit may be commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180 days 
after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. The obligee named in the 
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment deleted "and regulations" after "Rules" 
in Subsection (2); substituted "may sue" for 
"shall have the right to sue" in the first sen-
tence of Subsection (3); deleted "However" at 
the beginning of the second sentence of Subsec-
tion (3); inserted "and surety company" in the 
second sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "per-
sonally or" after "served" in the last sentence 
of Subsection (3); substituted "on the contrac-
tor" for "in an envelope addressed to the con-
tractor" in the last sentence of Subsection (3); 
inserted "and surety company" and "or surety 
company" in the last sentence of Subsection 
(3); deleted "but no suit shall be commenced 
later than one year from the date on which the 
last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied by the person bringing the suit" at the 
end of the first sentence of Subsection (4); 
added the second sentence of Subsection (4); 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of proof. 
Timeliness of action. 
Work performed without contract. 
Burden of proof. 
In action by materialman on payment bond, 
materialman did not have the burden to prove 
that the materials furnished were actually de-
livered to the job site or that they were actu-
ally incorporated into the structure, but only 
that the materials were furnished in connec-
tion with the particular project. City Elec. v. 
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1984). 
Timeliness of action. 
The appropriate test for determining 
whether an action on a payment bond was 
brought within the required statutory time pe-
riod was not the "substantial completion" date; 
it was rather whether the material in question 
was supplied as a part of the original contract 
or for the purpose of correcting defects or mak-
ing repairs following inspection of the project. 
City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1984). 
Work performed without contract. 
Where construction company proceeded to 
demolish race track and install a soccer field 
for Utah Golden Spikers and state of Utah 
without an executed agreement and without 
compliance with § 64-1-4, there was no con-
tract with the state of Utah by which it was 
obliged to require the Golden Spikers to fur-
nish performance and payment bonds. 
Breitling Bros. Constr. v. Utah Golden 
Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979). 
63-56-39. Form of bonds — Effect of certified copy. 
The form of the bonds required by this part shall be established by rules and 
regulations. Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond 
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A 
certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execu-
tion, and delivery of the original. 
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